Eline is a historian of twentieth-century Latin America whose work focuses on revolutions, transnational and grassroots activism, and Cold War foreign policy. Her research examines the international dimensions of Nicaragua’s revolutionary decade, European solidarity movements, and the broader web of relations between Central America and Europe. Currently, she is an Associate Professor in International History at the University of Leeds.

In this interview, we discuss her latest book, Nicaragua Must Survive: Revolutionary Diplomacy in the Global Cold War, which examines how the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) sought international support amid a rapidly shifting global landscape. We also discuss the legacy of the Sandinistas and what organizers can learn from these strategies today.

HC: What drew you to study Nicaragua’s diplomatic relations during the Cold War? What was your main interest or personal motivation with this topic? 

Eline: I wanted to write about what I’ve always been interested in: people fighting for social change and mobilizing, and people who advise others to pick up arms against their own government and leave everything behind. 

I wanted to write the kind of history of how the Nicaraguans, how the Sandinistas have managed this really ambitious and creative international foreign policy. What surprised me was how, despite their small size, they were able to use the international environment for the revolution’s advantage. And then I realized what was happening here in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 80s was part of a much bigger story, in which it is not necessarily a history of the Netherlands but more a history of the internationalization of the revolution. 

HC: What was so innovative about the Sandinistas’ foreign policy before and after the revolution?

Eline: I think when we if we look at the beginnings of it, we have to realize that the Sandinistas weren’t in charge of the state yet. They were just a small, quite unsuccessful group of young people in exile, and they had been trying to topple the Somozas ‘ regime for decades, but they just couldn’t. They didn’t really have contacts with traditional diplomats, like between ambassadors or between foreign ministers. So what they had to do was kind of try and get to these higher levels of the state through the grassroots, a kind of bottom-up approach. 

What was creative, I think, is that they used culture, they used artists, they used literacy, they used people like Ernesto Cardenal, and poetry. They used the kind of cultural appeal that they had; they used that as a way to get to these higher-level diplomats. 

And then these grassroots organizers could write to their MPs, the members of parliament who could then suddenly table questions about what was happening in Nicaragua, which meant that foreign ministers had to respond, which meant that diplomats suddenly had to think about Nicaragua. Which they previously didn’t. So they really managed to put Nicaragua on the political agenda from the bottom up, through raising this interest to culture, to solidarity, to a kind of young people meeting each other. And I think that that is incredibly creative.

And then after the revolution, I think for a couple of years they kind of thought, “okay, now we’re on track to the state, we don’t really need that creative diplomacy anymore. We can now just meet directly with state leaders”. But then, when Reagan came to power, they realized, well, that that’s just not going to be enough. They still need that cultural appeal.

HC: How did the context of the Cold War impact the Sandinistas’ diplomatic strategies? 

Eline: They tried to go beyond this Cold War framework and say, “what is happening here has essentially nothing to do with the Cold War”, and that “we are just here for the improvement of our own country, basically for social justice. We are anti-imperialist, but we’re not necessarily against the United States. We just want to be independent.”

So the Sandinistas had to decide, should we use the Cold War lens or should we use the anti-imperialist lens? Should we use the non-aligned lens? Their popularity was linked to this whole idea of staying out of the Cold War narrative, but if there wasn’t the Cold War, then they couldn’t use that argument that got people interested in the revolution in the first place. So it was a bit of a paradox there.

HC: What would motivate Europeans to support the Sandinista struggle? 

Eline: I think for a lot of people, the Nicaraguan Revolution offered hope that a kind of radical revolutionary change was still possible. If we think about the specific context in Western Europe at the time, we had Thatcher in the UK, we had conservatives, and we had Christian Democrats in power.

In a way, Nicaragua was an escape for many. People saw themselves, in a way, as refugees from Thatcher’s Britain, and Nicaragua offered hope for the future. There was hope that the revolution would be different, social democratic, radical communist, and Soviet. Also, the Christian appeal of the revolution, this kind of liberation theology, attracted some to the revolution.

At the time, when the political space in Europe for the left was kind of closing, like Chile was over, that they kind of saw this idea that there was a different future that was still possible, even if it wasn’t happening in Europe at the time. And the Sandinistas were very successful in making people believe that and making people feel that they could be part of the revolution.

HC: What were some material outcomes of these diplomatic efforts?

Eline: I would say that by putting Nicaragua on the political agenda, it certainly had an impact on the politicians who were pushing for more aid. And in the beginning, I think there was this sense that the Western European governments could contribute to the revolution. So they did contribute to the literacy campaign. So Nicaragua got a lot of money from Western Europe, more than the other Central American countries.

But to what extent was that the result of the Europeans trying to get Nicaragua out of the Soviet camp, or to that to what extent was that the result of solidarity activism, that’s hard to say. Um, obviously, pragmatic decision-making at the state level made a big difference. There are also direct campaigns such as the Nicaragua Must Survive campaign that was meant to fundraise directly for Nicaragua, and that one did bring in quite a lot of money. It made a difference, but Nicaragua’s economy tanked in the late 80s. So it wasn’t enough, but it did probably make a difference in terms of the longevity of the revolution. 

HC: In your opinion, do you think that the legacy of what Nicaragua meant in the 80s still shapes how Nicaragua is perceived today?

Eline: At least in Europe, I think it’s been our experience that a lot of older academics or activists really still hold on to the revolution as this very beautiful thing that they were a part of. Um, but they’re not so much attuned to what’s going on now.

I do think that when people think about Nicaragua, they think about the 80s, they think about kind of the mug that they have, and well, I think I say in the book that Nicaragua has become kind of a memory, nostalgia for people rather than a real place.

Obviously is very difficult for Nicaraguans today who are saying, well, we might be like a fun childhood memory for you but we are still living here, and this is still a real country and real place with real problems that we would like to address.

I think, for the current young Nicaraguans and exiles living abroad to make that change happen that they’re looking for because the people who are probably more interested in Nicaragua still I think they they know that what is happening now in Nicaragua is terrible and they I think they find it very difficult to then side with the anti-government and to take it like to speak out publicly.

I think by now, becoming really openly critical of the Ortega regime, they kind of have a hard time saying goodbye to their own childhood memories and the time when they were still young and happy.

HC: What lessons, what lessons, from the Sandinista solidarity strategy should contemporary solidarity take? 

Eline: I think one thing is what we learned from the book, and I think what was so successful about the solidarity campaigns is the importance of personal human connections. And I think like the brigantistas going to Nicaragua meeting people, but also Nicaragua’s traveling, having these one-to-one conversations, like really building this up from the grassroots level, made it last longer.

And I think today with social media and everything, you can have a huge impact shortly, but then it dies out rather quickly as well, because I think these one-to-one human connections aren’t there. So I think it shows the value of this kind of hard work at the grassroots level that can then eventually pay off. And I think today it kind of seems to move a bit quicker because maybe we lack those personal one-to-one connections that last longer. 

HC: What surprised you the most during your research?

Eline: The whole thing has been such a journey and a surprise for me. I think personally, I have become a lot more interested now in stories related to a kind of peace-building rather than radical revolutionary change. So I think learning about Nicaragua kind of made me realize that there’s so much more beyond this revolutionary triumph.

This moment of revolution in which everyone is happy, okay, that’s already incredible that people made that happen, but the hard work comes after. And I think the Nicaragua story made me realize that that is probably the most important work that historians tend to kind of forget about, because we like big stories about revolution and triumph and then the actual hard grassroots work to kind of make peace and build a better future.